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Abstract 
The financial crisis has highlighted the vulnerability of International Financial Centres 
(IFCs). However, very little is known about specialised IFCs, in particular about the impact 
on their niche activities and the strategies they have developed to return to growth. This 
article addresses these questions by examining the case of Luxembourg. Firstly, the findings 
suggest that the increasing concentration of financial services companies has over time 
created agglomeration economies and contributed to making Luxembourg one of the few 
global specialist financial centres. IFCs such as Luxembourg are part of a new environment 
in which competitive advantage will increasingly be based less on regulatory issues and more 
on the diversity and quality of the services offered. Secondly, the evolution of the financial 
industry in Luxembourg suggests that a strategy of continuous innovation has been adopted 
to maintain the comparative competitiveness of the financial centre. 
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Niche markets within the global financial system 
The ongoing financial crisis has highlighted the vulnerability of International Financial 
Centres (IFCs) and the importance of adaptation strategies to the geography of finance. 
London and New York, for example, have reported large losses of assets and jobs since the 
beginning of the crisis in June 2007 and the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in September 
2008. However, little attention has been paid to the impact of the crisis on the category of 
smaller IFCs, also known as “sub-centres” (Grote, 2009) or “global specialists” (City of 
London, 2010), which have become important international hubs for wealth management, 
commodity trade finance, insurance and reinsurance, or investment funds, such as Geneva, 
Dublin and Luxembourg (Roberts, 1994). In the context of increasing pressure from national 
regulators and international bodies, what has been the impact of the crisis on their niche 
activities? What strategies have they developed to recover from the crisis and return to 
growth? These issues are addressed by examining the case of Luxembourg and questioning 
the two major clichés commonly applied to its financial centre. 
 
In accordance with the first cliché, it is often assumed that Luxembourg is too dependent on 
the domestic markets of its neighbours to develop as an autonomous financial market. Our 
hypothesis is, however, that far from being limited to being a “tax paradise”, which is what 
the first part of our title – quoting a disenchanted German banker – refers to, the development 
of the sector is now in addition increasingly dependent on agglomeration economies. As the 
financial activity and diversity of the establishments in question increase, we assume that the 
advantages of the niche policy cannot by themselves explain the sustainability of 
Luxembourg. We believe that specialised IFCs such as Luxembourg are part of a new 
environment, in which differentiation will increasingly depend less on regulatory issues and 
more on the diversity and quality of localised services.  3 
 
The second common cliché is that Luxembourg is a fragile IFC due to the typical advantages 
of a niche policy, notably banking secrecy and tax incentives (Palan, Murphy and 
Chavagneux, 2010). These advantages could be threatened by the mobility of capital at the 
global level and by developments in terms of regulation at the EU level. However, unlike 
those who consider that such countries have “failed to move with the times” (Palan, 2003, 
page 112), our hypothesis is that Luxembourg had to constantly innovate in such a way that 
the deregulation, which has taken place from the 1980s onwards, did not erode its 
comparative advantages. Until now, this strategy has appeared to be successful, as 
exemplified by the adaptive efforts made in the fields of investment funds, private banking 
and financial engineering over the past twenty years or so, as well as more recently in the 
areas of estate management, securitisation, venture capital and reinsurance (OECD, 2008). To 
avoid any misunderstanding, it should be stated that even when focussing on certain success 
factors and current challenges for this comparably young and fast-growing financial centre, 
we will neither be advocating a “Luxembourg model” – see Clark and Wójcik‟s (2005) 
criticism of generalising case studies – nor do we intend to base our argument exclusively on 
a regional innovation system approach. We are, rather, interested in the way a specific local 
environment with its corporate and public actors and the resultant institutional setting is 
intertwined with overarching international development trends and regulatory constraints. 
 
The first part of the paper reviews the literature concerning specialised financial centres, 
focusing on the geography of finance and offshore issues. The second part presents the 
methodology and data. In the third part, we discuss the contribution of the financial centre to 
the national and regional economy and examine how Luxembourg has dealt with the crisis 
from 2007 onwards. More specifically, the paper examines the extent to which Luxembourg 4 
has developed endogenous competitive advantages going beyond regulatory incentives. The 
fifth part illustrates the strategy of innovation followed by Luxembourg and the remediation 
strategies developed to ensure the sustainability of the IFC. The final part concludes by 
stressing Luxembourg‟s potential to adapt to the present turbulent times and considers some 
of the long-term perspectives. 
 
Scholarly debates on specialised financial centres 
Over the past decade, numerous attempts have been made to classify financial centres in a 
hierarchical way, considering either quantitative indicators related to the presence of 
company headquarters (Choi, Park and Tschoegl, 2003) or the relative size of financial 
markets (Poon, Eldredge and Yeung, 2004), or a mix of quantitative indicators and 
assessments from the industry itself (City of London, 2010). While the ranking of financial 
centres may vary according to which indicators are used, geographers tend to divide them 
into three major groups: (1) world financial centres such as London, New York and Tokyo, 
which are unchallenged in their respective areas; (2) second-tier financial centres such as 
Paris, Frankfurt, Amsterdam or Milan, which clearly dominate the national and sometimes 
the regional area; and (3) sub-centres such as Munich, Geneva, Dublin or Luxembourg, 
which have developed special competencies (Grote, 2009). The first two categories seem to 
have attracted most of the scholarly interest, especially London (Thrift 1994; Taylor et al, 
2003; Roberts, 2008), New York (Schwartz, 1992; Longcore and Rees, 1996; Pohl 2004), and 
Frankfurt (Grote, Lo and Harrschar-Ehrnborg, 2002; Grote, 2008; Faulconbridge, 2004; 
König et al, 2007; Schamp, 2009). 
 
However, work examining the importance and sustainability of sub-centres within the global 
economy has been rather limited (see Murphy 1998; Sokol 2007). Luxembourg is no 5 
exception to this. Some comparative studies conducted at the European level still ignore the 
city despite its key role within the geography of European finance (Tschoegl, 2000; 
Karreman, 2009), while other worldwide studies do not comment on the specificities of the 
location (Poon, 2003; Poon, Eldredge and Yeung, 2004), or consider such international 
financial centres only as offshore centres (see Cassis 2006). As a result, most of the studies 
on the development of the financial industry in Luxembourg have been produced by 
consultancies or by a small number of academics (Hübsch 2004; Franz, 2005; Bourgain and 
Pieretti, 2006; Pieretti, Bourgain and Courtin, 2007; Walther and Schulz 2009). 
 
Interestingly, the literature on sub-centres seems to be divided into two bodies of literature, 
which do not often overlap, as was already noted by Murphy (1998) over ten years ago. One 
of the main challenges when studying sub-centres is, therefore, to combine the geography of 
finance approach, which deals primarily with the centrifugal and centripetal forces explaining 
the concentration of financial activities, and the approach developed by scholars of 
international relations and political economy, dealing with the legal and regulatory incentives 
of offshore financial centres and state sovereignty. As noted by Hudson (2000), some 
convergence between the two approaches has been seen recently. This is all the more 
necessary given that far from being isolated and purely opportunistic, the rise of the so-called 
offshore centres is structurally linked to the changing world economy (Hudson, 1998), and in 
particular the internationalisation of capital (Palan, 2003). 
 
As with any other financial centres, three major types of factors influence the development of 
sub-centres: the nature of financial products, classical Marshallian externalities, and social 
networks (Gordon and McCann, 2000). Firstly, as showed by Clark and O‟Connor (1997, 
page 95), “financial products often have a distinct spatial configuration of information 6 
embedded in their design”. Small financial centres are more likely to specialise in opaque 
products which require a greater degree of non-codified knowledge, such as private equity, 
mergers and acquisitions transactions, and in translucent products such as hedge funds, rather 
than in transparent products such as currency exchange, which tend to be concentrated in a 
limited number of large IFCs, in order to benefit from economies of scale. Given that opaque 
products have a tendency to be transformed into more transparent products, IFCs can 
maintain their competitive advantages in two ways: by developing their intermediation 
capacity as gatekeepers mediating between outsiders from global markets and local 
knowledge, and by transforming transparent products into translucent products by attracting 
skilled traders (Faulconbridge et al, 2007). 
 
Secondly, there is no doubt that labour market pooling, the supply of intermediate goods and 
technological and informational spillovers play a fundamental role in the formation of 
financial sub-centres (Porteous, 1999; Gehrig, 2000; Storper and Venables, 2004). Even 
though agglomeration economies favour those markets where the density of employment and 
of companies is at its highest, the growth of smaller-sized financial centres can also follow 
from extreme specialisation, encouraged by the exploitation of a niche related to national 
sovereignty. Certain initial comparative advantages can then result in a cumulative process in 
which the location of banks that are attracted by framework conditions can subsequently 
increase the attractiveness of the location for banks that are not yet established there (Grote, 
2008). 
 
Thirdly, small international financial centres also connect individuals who share social and 
cultural values and interact within social networks (Thrift, 1994). The exchange of these 
values is essential to maintaining trust and reputation, the two pillars upon which much of 7 
financial intermediation relies. Social relationships, informal rules and interpersonal networks 
established in business are thus constitutive of markets (Peck, 2005). The effectiveness of 
these standards and rules is greatly enhanced by the physical proximity between actors, which 
is usually found in financial districts and small-sized IFCs (Longcore and Rees, 1996; 
McDowell, 1997). 
 
The second body of literature relevant to the case of specialised IFCs deals with the rise of 
offshore finance and the reworking of state sovereignty (Roberts, 1994; Hudson, 1998; 2000; 
Vlcek, 2008). A major contribution of this literature has been to analyse the diversity of 
financial centres and to distinguish between international financial centres, offshore centres 
and pure tax havens (Palan, Murphy and Chavagneux, 2010). An offshore financial centre is 
usually considered as a country or jurisdiction that makes its living “mainly by attracting 
overseas financial capital” and offers “foreign businesses and well-heeded individuals (…) 
low or no taxes, political stability, business friendly regulation and laws, and above all 
discretion” (The Economist, 2007, page 3), whereas tax havens are regarded as “countries 
that have enacted tax legislation especially designed to attract the formation of branches and 
subsidiaries of parent companies based in heavily-taxed industrial nations” (Starchild, 1994, 
page 1). 
 
The heterogeneity of financial centres has long presented a problem to such classification 
(IMF, 2000), as is well illustrated by the case of Luxembourg. On the one hand, Luxembourg 
has been regularly identified as an offshore financial centre (Palan, 2003; Zoromé, 2007), due 
to its favourable income tax rates and banking secrecy rules. On the other hand, the country is 
a robust, efficient and well-supervised financial centre with sound institutions and has 
developed one of the most stringent regulatory regimes with regard to money laundering, 8 
which has nothing in common with badly-run tax havens in the Caribbean Sea or the Pacific 
(IMF, 2002). As Schaus (CSSF, 2004, page 5), former Director General of Luxembourg‟s 
Financial Sector Supervisory Authority (CSSF) argues, Luxembourg cannot be easily 
reduced to one or the other category: “Luxembourg has never been an offshore financial 
centre, as it has never developed in the absence of tax or regulatory constraints. It will never 
be an onshore financial centre like any others either, as it will always be dependent on foreign 
capital”. 
 
Another contribution of this approach has been to show that offshore finance does not act on 
the margins of the international financial system but rather is closely interrelated with it 
(Palan, Murphy and Chavagneux, 2010). Although the statistical data remain unclear, a great 
deal of evidence suggests that offshore finance processes or manages a huge proportion of the 
money coming from or going into the world economy, estimated at 51% of all cross-border 
assets and liabilities – about $ 5 to 7 trillion in 2007 (The Economist, 2007). Accordingly, 
offshore financial centres are now not limited solely to tax avoidance but rather are deeply 
integrated into the globalised economy. A third contribution of that approach has been to 
make clear that offshore finance did not appear from nowhere but rather was encouraged by 
certain Western countries, at least until the late 1990s when a campaign against “harmful tax 
competition” (OECD, 1998) and pressure from the EU on international policy regarding 
offshore activities developed (Hampton and Christensen, 1999). 
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Methodology and data 
Our analysis of the impact of the crisis on the financial industry in Luxembourg is developed 
using primary and secondary data from various sources, before and after the financial crisis. 
Drawing inspiration from the study carried out by Taylor et al. (2003) on the City of London, 
a questionnaire seeking to identify the main advantages of a Luxembourg business location 
was sent at the beginning in June 2007 to 424 firms in the financial sector. Of these, 128 were 
banks, 110 were insurance and reinsurance companies, and 185 were Professionals of the 
Financial Sector (PSFs), i.e. enterprises either connected with or complementary to the 
financial sector. The final sample consisted of the 44 banks, 22 insurance and reinsurance 
companies and 43 PFSs which answered our questionnaire. The study was complemented by 
22 personal semi-directed interviews with top managers from a sample of those 100 global 
service firms identified by Taylor (2004), of which 48 were located in Luxembourg at that 
time. Interviews were conducted with high-ranking representatives of banking and financial 
firms, as well as insurance, accountancy, law and management consultancy firms. This 
survey provides information on the financial industry just before the financial crisis. 
 
As far as the post-crisis period is concerned, interviews were conducted in 2010 with a 
selection of 10 bankers, fund managers, representatives of the professional bodies and the 
CSSF. The main objective was to assess the impact of the crisis and the remediation 
strategies developed by the local actors. Secondary data were also collected, including 
statistics from the National Statistical Office, the Central Bank of Luxembourg, the European 
Fund and Asset Management Association, and the CSSF. Consultancy reports, policy 
documents from the UE and the OECD, press statements and the relevant scientific literature 
have also been examined. These secondary sources provide further quantitative details on the 
impact of the financial crisis from 2007 to 2010. 10 
Luxembourg as a global specialist 
Because of the quality and depth of its financial services, Luxembourg has been described as 
a “global specialist” (City of London, 2010). It is considered to be the leading private 
banking centre in the Eurozone, the second-largest mutual fund centre in the world, and the 
leading captive reinsurance market within the EU (LFF, 2009). This section examines the 
origins of its niche policy and the consequences of the financial downturn, and presents some 
of the factors that allowed Luxembourg to be resilient through these turbulent times. 
 
The rise of the international financial centre 
Three main periods can be distinguished with regard to the development of Luxembourg as 
an IFC. A first period, starting in the 1960s, during which Luxembourg became home to 
American and European banks working in the Euromarket (OECD, 2008); a second period, 
starting in the early 1980s, during which private banking and investment funds became 
increasingly important; and a third period, starting in the 2000s, in which more sophisticated 
and less regulated funds were introduced, as well as insurance and reinsurance activities. 
Throughout the period from the 1960s to the mid-2000s, the success of the Luxembourg 
financial market was characterised by sustained growth in the balance sheets of banks. While 
the economic crisis in 2002 and 2003 saw a temporary fallback, growth began again from 
2004, with a maximum of € 1,002 billion reached in October 2008 (Figure 1). The number of 
banks reached a peak in 1994 (222), before undergoing constant decline due to M&A activity 
that characterised the sector at the international level. 
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Figure 1. Number of banks and their balance sheets, 1960-2010 
 
Sources: CBL, CSSF. Illustration: the authors. 
 
One of the characteristics of Luxembourg as a financial centre is its domination by foreign 
banks. As shown in Table 2, branches and subsidiaries from Germany constituted a third of 
the total number in Luxembourg in 2009, followed by banks from France, Italy, and 
Switzerland. 
 
Table 1. Origins of the banks, 2001 and 2009 
Country  2001  2009 
  Number  Proportion  Number  Proportion 
Germany  59  31.2  45  30.2 
France  17  9.0  15  10.1 
Italy  21  11.1  11  7.4 
Switzerland  12  6.3  11  7.4 
Belgium and Luxembourg  20  10.6  14  9.4 
UK  6  3.2  8  5.4 
Sweden  6  3.2  7  4.7 
USA  6  3.2  6  4.0 
Japan  5  2.6  5  3.4 
China  4  2.1  4  2.7 
The Netherlands  5  2.6  4  2.7 
Israel  5  2.6  3  2.0 
Others  23  12.2  16  10.7 
Total  189  100.0  149  100.0 
Source: CSSF 12 
 
Subsidiaries whose headquarters are located in Frankfurt, Paris and Brussels are particularly 
numerous (Walther and Schulz, 2009), illustrating the key role played by Luxembourg for 
neighbouring European economies. Today, despite the fact that about 70% of them are 
subsidiaries of well-known banks, the number of banks employing less than 50 employees 
has decreased sharply over the last decade, from 63% in 2000 to 52% in 2009 (CSSF, 2010). 
This shows that, unlike in some offshore financial centres, banks in Luxembourg are far from 
being empty shells with merely a minimal physical presence in the country (the average of 
workers per bank was 177 in 2009). 
 
Today, the financial sector is by a considerable margin the main driver of the national 
economy. With 55,000 jobs directly linked to the financial services, the sector accounts for 
22% of domestic employment, 31% of public revenue and 38% of Gross Domestic Product 
(Deloitte, 2009). Table 2 shows that the sector experienced strong annual average growth 
(4.7%) between 2000 and 2009, particularly for PSFs (+18.4%) and Undertakings for 
Collective Investment firms (UCIs) (+89.4% from 2003), which benefit from the outsourcing 
of certain activities previously carried out by the banks. 
 
Table 2. Employment in the financial sector, 2000-2009 
  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009 
Banks, Stock 
Exchange, Cetrel  23,321  23,952  23,600  22,839  22,869  23,550  25,084  26,457  27,524  26,740 
Insurance  and 
reinsurance 
companies  9,268  9,532  9,556  9,579  9,555  9,662  9,769  10,886  11,087  11,877 
PSFs  3,499  4,176  4,399  4,455  6,059  6,547  9,928  12,174  13,507  13,485 
UCIs companies  0  0  0  98  507  1,572  2,069  2,348  2,386  2,308 
Total  36,088  37,660  37,555  36,971  38,990  41,331  46,850  51,865  54,504  54,410 
Sources: CSSF, CAA, Cetrel and IGSS. 
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Even without taking the PSFs into account, Luxembourg had more employment directly 
linked to finance and more banks than Geneva (Geneva Financial Center, 2009), and more 
than Dublin‟s international financial services centre, which was home to 24,906 jobs at the 
end of 2008 (Finance Dublin, 2009). 
 
The impact of the crisis: not as severe as expected? 
The recent financial crisis certainly hit Luxembourg (OECD, 2010), but the financial sector 
seems to have recovered fairly rapidly. In terms of employment, job losses represented only 
2.3% of the workforce in the financial sector as a whole and 2.9% in the banking industry in 
2009. PSFs have lost only 1.0% of their workforce, while employment in UCIs remained 
stable over the period (CSSF, 2010). These figures indicate that job losses in Luxembourg 
were, proportionally, similar to those in Geneva (2.6% in banking from September 2007 to 
July 2009, according to the Geneva Statistical Office), and less significant than in world 
centres such as New York, which is reported to have lost 8.8% of its jobs in banking and 
financial services between 2007 and 2009 (Bloomberg, 2009), or London, where net job 
losses in financial services are estimated at 15.3% of the employed workers over the same 
period (City of London, 2010). Even Dublin, which performed well in 2008, is expected to 
have lost jobs in 2009 and 2010 (IBEC, 2010). 
 
In terms of assets, the balance sheets of banks shrank from 951 to 793 billion (-16%) between 
2008 and 2010, but only a limited number of subsidiaries from Iceland closed, while mergers 
and takeovers of larger groups had certain impacts on Luxembourg (e.g. the takeover of Sal. 
Oppenheim by Deutsche Bank in 2009). Despite being more limited than in many other 
OECD countries (OECD, 2010), the state interventions have proved successful. A substantive 
loan of € 2.5 billion (6% of the country‟s GDP) was converted into equity in December 2008 14 
in order to re-capitalise part of Fortis‟s banking activities in the country, reutilising its former 
name Banque Générale du Luxembourg (BGL) in a joint enterprise with BNP Paribas, which 
holds the other two third of BGL‟s capital. Luxembourg also acted together with Belgium 
and France to support Dexia. A total of € 400 million of public subsidies was spent to rescue 
Dexia Banque Internationale à Luxembourg, whose group was the second largest employer in 
the country after ArcelorMittal. 
 
Banks saw a positive change in their net profits, which increased from € 218 to 2,740 million 
between 2008 and 2009, compared to € 4,739 in 2007 (-42.2%) (CSSF, 2010). In a context in 
which private banking assets declined by 15% and operating profits margins dropped by 27% 
in Western Europe in 2008 (McKinsey, 2009), the Luxembourg private banking sector has 
done surprisingly well during the crisis. It is true that net inflows have been stagnating since 
the beginning of the crisis, reaching 2% in 2007 and 0% in 2008; however, private banks 
located in Luxembourg remain among the most profitable in Europe, thanks to a profit 
margin that has been higher than that of the banking industry in general (Deloitte, 2009). The 
insurance and reinsurance sector has fared well over this difficult period, with an increase in 
net profits of +98% in 2009 in comparison with the previous year, especially for life 
insurance. These good performances result from a strategy favouring non-risky vehicles, 
from better protection against debtors than that enjoyed by banks, and from the arrival of the 
Swiss reinsurer SwissRe, which inaugurated its European headquarters in Luxembourg in 
2009 to benefit from the EU‟s Reinsurance Directive which allows companies to do business 
in any other EU member state once a reinsurer is allowed in one member state (EC, 2005). 
 
The fund industry also appears to have weathered the crisis well. Luxembourg experienced 
one of the strongest asset growths in 2009 (+19.1%), and accounts for a third of all assets in 15 
the Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities (UCITS) market in 
Europe (Efama, 2010). The country is the world‟s leading location for cross-border 
distributed UCITS and seems to have retained the confidence of investors, even though funds 
from Luxembourg used by US or UK funds as intermediate vehicles for investing in 
Germany or France have dropped because of the crisis. As shown in Figure 2, the total assets 
under management in January 2010 are approximately the same as before the crisis in 
January 2007 (€ 2.1 trillion), while the number of funds increased steadily over the period, 
reaching 3,500. The industry was not affected by the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy and 
“only” € 1.9 billion were lost in the Madoff scandal in 2008. Since the beginning of the crisis, 
only about 10 funds have been suspended.  
 




Tax incentives and spillover effects 
One of the reasons why Luxembourg performed well during the crisis is related to the fact 
that tax incentives are also complemented by spillover effects. Even though the origins of 
Luxembourg‟s financial centre are due in large part to an ongoing and highly-adaptable niche 
policy, the role of the latter is increasingly added to by other locational advantages. These 
include both endogenous agglomeration advantages, as well as Luxembourg‟s strong ties to 
international networks. 
 
As Figure 3 indicates, the most widely cited reason for doing business in Luxembourg City 
remains the “simple and favourable legal and regulatory environment”. This aspect is 
strengthened by the importance granted to the adaptability of its legislative and regulatory 
framework. Luxembourg has a first mover advantage in that European directives are rapidly 
transposed into national law. This allowed Luxembourg to become the first country of the 
European Union to apply the regulation on UCITS I, encouraging the domiciliation of 
investment funds as early as 1988. Other regulatory modifications in the field of international 
pension funds and new financial engineering products intended to replace holding companies 
dating back to 1929 have since then strengthened the sector. Luxembourg has recently 
introduced two new instruments: the Risk Capital Investment Company (SICAR), an 
investment fund created in 2004 and which does not impose any restrictions on portfolio 
investments or investment policy, and the Specialised Investment Funds (SIF), created in 
2007 to anticipate the forthcoming EU Directive on Alternative Investment Fund Managers 
(AIFM) (OECD, 2010). 
 
In addition to these regulatory factors, Figure 3 also confirms that the time of the exclusive 
tax niche has gone, meaning that endogenous forces are increasingly important. The financial 17 
centre having reached a certain size, the installation of a great number of foreign banks 
attracts those banks that are not yet installed there, for reasons of either competition or 
credibility. This effect contributes to the critical mass effect of the financial market where 
this movement also goes along with a strengthening of the financial sector in the strict sense, 
in the area of insurance companies and advanced services enterprises, and in the fields of 
audit, accounting, law or information technologies. 
 
Figure 3. General advantages of a Luxembourg City location, 2007 
 
Note: N= 109 firms. Source: the authors. 
 
As far as endogenous forces are concerned, the interviewees appreciated the proximity to 
local and national authorities and to professional bodies. As a manager of a large Swiss bank 
asserts: “Here in Luxembourg, it‟s probably an advantage to have a close relationship to the 18 
regulators. You can really ask them for advice. In Germany or in Switzerland, it‟s not that 
easy or it‟s nearly impossible to call the BaFin [the German Federal Financial Supervisory 
Authority] and say „Hey, I have a new business idea and how is your attitude towards this?‟” 
(interview, 21st June 2007). Local contacts are made easy by the small size of Luxembourg 
City – 90,000 inhabitants but 150,000 jobs – and by the extremely high concentration of 
financial services within the CBD and the Kirchberg area. 
 
These factors promote face-to-face contacts. It is true, as Boschma (2005) argues, that spatial 
proximity is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for localised knowledge spillovers 
to develop. In an urban area, financial firms require in particular cognitive and social 
proximity, the former being related to the capacity of actors to share the same knowledge 
base and expertise, and the latter being related to the embeddedness of business relations and 
trust in a social context. However, as a small IFC, Luxembourg provides strong advantages in 
terms of both kinds of proximity: cognitive proximity is encouraged by the specialisation of 
the financial industry in certain products or operations, whereas social proximity is 
encouraged by the dense network of formal and informal relations developed between peers 
and/or competitors in the City, and between them and the political-regulatory sphere. As a 
partner in a London-based law firm argues: “We very much benefit from the support of 
service-sector institutions such as the CSSF and to professional bodies. (…) Of course, the 
entire legal and regulatory environment is a key feature for our firm. But proximity matters, 
especially when we have to discuss with ministries” (interview, 11 June 2007). 
 
The development of the financial industry particularly benefited from the “access to a skilled 
labour supply”. It appears that the well-educated and multilingual workforce of Luxembourg 
offers a true advantage when compared to other financial markets throughout the world. 19 
Luxembourg has managed to create a sufficiently large labour pool possessing appropriate 
skills and which is attractive to institutions in Europe. When compared with other financial 
markets such as Dublin, Luxembourg does indeed offer interesting opportunities. The 
Luxembourg-based financial industry had resulted in the development of highly specialised 
regional cross-border labour pooling (Walther and Dautel, 2010). More than 150,000 
commuters cross the border every day from neighbouring France, Germany, and Belgium, 
contributing to the rise of a functionally-integrated cross-border metropolitan area of around 
800,000 inhabitants, comparable in size to Geneva or Basel, two other knowledge-intensive 
European metropolitan centres (Sohn, Reitel and Walther, 2009).  
 
The ability to attract senior managers is an important issue in terms of diversification of 
activity and the development towards less back-office activities. In fact, core financial 
activities are organised in a very hierarchical and uneven way at the international level: as 
regards asset management, for example, the core business is still operated in a few large 
financial centres such as London, Paris and Zurich, for British, French and Swiss banks 
respectively. Being innovative in that kind of business is certainly important for Luxembourg 
if the city wants to develop more core activities in the value chain of the finance industry 
(Pieretti, Bourgain and Courtin, 2007). The bankers interviewed agreed that there was clearly 
a lack of experienced people, but they also recognised that the increasing international 
recognition of Luxembourg as a specialised financial centre makes recruitment somewhat 
easier than a decade ago, especially for young, highly motivated graduates.  
 
Additional adaptation strategies 
As shown above, adaptation to changing regulatory and market environments has been 
closely linked to various types of innovation. The fund industry, for example, has been 20 
diversifying from traditional retail funds to alternative investment funds (such as private 
equity, property or hedge funds) over recent years. About 700 such funds were domiciled in 
June 2009, with a total of € 128.5 billion under management. A degree of uncertainty is 
currently affecting these funds, due to the proposed AIFM European Directive, which seeks 
to ensure that all investment fund managers are subject to harmonised regulatory standards 
(EC, 2009). Their funds will be authorised to operate under a passport system throughout the 
EU once they have been authorised in one country. As an alternative to Cayman or Bermuda 
funds, Luxembourg is expected to benefit from the new global supervision of alternative 
funds and the re-domiciliation trend. This could mark a certain convergence between hedge 
funds and UCITS funds, which are also evolving rapidly. In 2009, Luxembourg adopted the 
new UCITS IV directive to enhance the harmonised European regime for investment funds 
(Ernst & Young, 2010), which will make it possible for an investment fund to be managed by 
an investment company located in another country within the EU. The new directive is 
expected to lead to cross-border mergers between funds, and contribute to the rationalisation 
of the industry to the benefit of Luxembourg (interview, 21
st April 2010). 
 
More recently, and clearly as a reaction to the financial crisis, the state and its business 
development agencies have been strongly engaged in the quest for further diversification of 
products and (geographical) markets for the financial sector. To date, the two most promising 




Islamic finance, i.e. the development and handling of Sharia-compliant financial products, in 
Luxembourg in fact goes back to 1983, with the first compliant insurance company in 21 
Europe. More recently, this sector has been recognised as being one of the most promising 
emerging markets, in both geographical and in product terms. In geographical terms this is 
because, apart from the petrol-exporting countries in the Middle East, some of the most 
dynamic industrialising countries in south and south-east Asia (e.g. Malaysia, Indonesia) are 
Muslim countries whose citizens are experiencing increasing wealth leading to a considerable 
growth of Sharia-sensitive investment assets. The same is true for institutional investors (e.g. 
pension funds and life insurances) from these regions looking for alternative investment 
opportunities at the international level. From a product-engineering point of view, Islamic 
banking requires a thorough understanding of the specific investment strategies, obviously 
differing strongly between the various countries. Human resources and individual expertise 
are therefore considered to be the most critical issues within the Islamic asset management 
industry (Ernst & Young, 2008). 
 
Today, Luxembourg is the largest non-Muslim Islamic fund domicile, representing 7% of 
global market share. All 40 funds – out of which 16 are listed as “sukuk” (bonds) on 
Luxembourg‟s stock exchange – recorded positive returns in 2009 (Lipper, 2010). While the 
total assets domiciled in Luxembourg amount to € 308 million, this sector admittedly still 
plays a minor role compared to the over € 2,000 billion of total assets under management in 
the country. Nevertheless, recent growth rates (e.g. 44% net asset growth between 2008 and 
2009) show the potential of this sector. 
 
These emerging activities are accompanied by a variety of measures taken by Luxembourg‟s 
government, such as establishing a taskforce to explore the development perspectives of 
Islamic banking and organising road shows in the various “client” countries within the 
framework of ministerial visits or of the promotional activities of the semi-public 22 
development agency “Luxembourg for Finance”. While Luxembourg remains the leading 
centre for Islamic finance in Europe, other financial centres, such as London, Paris and 
Dublin, are currently positioning themselves by establishing favourable institutional and 
legislative environments for Islamic investments (HSBC, 2009). 
 
Microfinance 
In terms of net assets, the more recently-emerging sector of Microfinance Investment 
Vehicles (MIVs), with its almost US$ 3 billion domiciled in Luxembourg, is currently more 
important, as it is with regard to Luxembourg‟s competitors. In 1998, Luxembourg was the 
chosen domicile of the first registered microfinance fund. Clearly, a particular setting 
providing both on the one hand, a strong civil society and public commitment to development 
cooperation, and, on the other hand, a competitive fund industry with its specific expertise 
and a favourable regulatory environment helped to establish MIVs and to attract foreign 
investors to domicile their funds in Luxembourg. 
 
Today, seven out of the world‟s ten largest MIVs are under management in Luxembourg, 
together accounting for around 45% of the world‟s MIV assets (€ 1,675 million, +39.6% 
between 2008 and 2009). Given its role in international development cooperation, there is a 
strong government commitment, which is not only mirrored by the usually high public 
involvement in terms of assets, but also by Luxembourg‟s efforts to establish a suitable 
environment for this particular industry. With the implementation of the Luxembourg Fund 
Labelling Agency (LuxFLAG) in 2006, an important certifying body supervising the MIVs‟ 
compliance with internationally recognised standards was created. In addition, in May 2010, 
LuxFLAG and the US-based MicroRate agency started a joint venture called LUMINIS 
Microfinance, in order to establish a competitive body to collect, analyse and validate 23 
information from the rapidly growing MIV sector, thus providing the labelling agencies as 
well as investors with reliable information about the MIVs‟ activities and development. In the 
same month, the new Home of Microfinance was inaugurated in a prestigious town house in 
the city centre, hosting Luxembourg‟s leading NGO in the field of microfinance (ADA – 
Appui au développement autonome), as well as the European Microfinance Platform, the 
Microinsurance Network, and the African Microfinance Transparency Forum. This publicly 
financed facility provides, in addition to office space, a library with an information centre and 
conference rooms. The European Microfinance Platform (e-MFP) organises the annual 
European Microfinance Week, during which it awards each year the European Microfinance 
Award to an institution based in a developing country for its efforts in the field of 
microfinance. 
 
According to representatives of Luxembourg‟s microfinance sector, the further growth of the 
sector is simultaneously threatening its success, as already today the most important MIVs 
“suffer” from over-liquidity, i.e. they are currently experiencing difficulties in transferring the 
invested assets to adequate projects in the target countries, mainly due to a lack of staff 
capacities and expertise in the fields of evaluation, handling and implementation of 
microfinance tools, to the great disappointment of major investors (interview, 19
th May 
2010). If this situation continues, it threatens to damage the sector‟s reputation. Over-
liquidity is one of the reasons why increasing attention is paid to the establishment of 
performance quality control instruments in order to avoid “black sheep” in the sector, and 
why the microfinance actors are extending their activities to other forms of Socially 
Responsible Investments (SRI). The latter include, for example, fund initiatives targeting 
small- and medium-sized enterprises in developing countries which are neither eligible for 
traditional microfinance tools nor usually able to obtain credit from the domestic banks. The 24 
REGMIFA fund, established in 2009, for example, focusing on SMEs in sub-Saharan Africa, 
started with funding commitments of US$ 150 million. 
 
Conclusion 
This paper has examined the question of why some specialised IFCs have proven resilient to 
the recent financial crisis, and suggests that Luxembourg‟s development strategy has been 
comparatively successful for two main reasons. 
 
Firstly, the increasing concentration of banks and financial services companies has over time 
created agglomeration economies and contributed to making Luxembourg one of the few 
global specialists in finance. Accordingly, the era of exclusive tax niche policies appears to 
be over. Even though Luxembourg was originally developed by a niche policy, there is 
growing empirical evidence that the city has generated its own “local buzz”. Luxembourg 
seems to benefit from a diversified and qualified cross-border labour pool, which gives the 
financial centre an international status and contributes to explaining its dominance as a hub 
for cross-border fund distribution within Europe. Luxembourg also benefits from being a 
small environment, which means that national and regulatory institutions can be easily 
approached. Our results are consistent with previous studies, which highlight the importance 
of agglomeration effects and show that the growth of the financial sector produces a 
significant increase in business services and non-financial market services (Bourgain and 
Pieretti, 2006). 
 
Secondly, the development of the financial industry in Luxembourg shows that a strategy of 
continuous innovation has been adopted to maintain the comparative competitiveness of the 
financial centre. This “first mover” strategy has enabled Luxembourg to adopt quickly a 25 
number of new European regulations, while maintaining distinctive advantages (including 
banking secrecy). It remains true, however, that the main drivers of the financial sector 
remain the investment fund industry and private banking. Strategies designed by public and 
private actors to develop alternatives, such as Islamic finance and microfinance, are still very 
limited in terms of assets under management. Nevertheless, these two emerging activities 
appear to be strongly reliant on the specific local context both in terms of institutional 
environment as well as in terms of location-specific expertise. 
 
The aftermath of the financial crisis shows that Luxembourg is navigating a narrow path. On 
the one hand, most of the actors in the financial sector are aware that, because of European 
and international regulatory pressure, approaches to risk management will have to be re-
assessed, transparency improved, clients‟ needs taken even more seriously, and more rigorous 
controls implemented. But, on the other hand, Luxembourg remains highly dependent on the 
skills that have allowed it to be successful (Falk, 2009). As recently expressed by Minister for 
Finances Luc Frieden at the Stock Exchange Day 2010, local actors also would like to 
“remain what they are” – which is the national motto (“Mir wëlle bleiwe wat mir sin”), 
painted on an ancient house in medieval Luxembourg City. 26 
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